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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

WJM

Project Proposal Memorandum

Request of
12 May 1949

To: B/EE (Att.: Intel. Control)
From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning
Subject: Finnish political parties

Delivered
5/18

Statement of Project

Origin: G/SI

Problem: To provide the information requested on the attached sheet.

Assumptions:

Rec'd in G/SI 17 May '49

Scope:

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Form: Working paper: not for dissemination.

Dates: To G/SI by 17 May.

Branch responsibilities: B/EE to prepare paper, with necessary consultation with B/No

Departmental responsibilities: None

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(Use verso of this sheet for other matter)

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RP-1

11 May 1949

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Staff Intelligence Group, ORE

25X1A

FROM : [REDACTED]
SUBJECT : Finnish Political Parties

1. Request information on the following points on a priority basis:

- a. Number of members of each major party.
- b. Platforms of major parties -- domestic and foreign.
- c. Number of members in Parliament representing each party.
- d. Leading personalities of Social Democratic Party.
- e. Influence and representation of each party in the executive branch of the government.
- f. Relationship of Social Democratic Party with other Finnish parties in aims and activities.
- g. Social Democratic Party's ties with and support from other Scandinavian Social Democratic Parties.

desired by 18 May

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FINNISH POLITICAL PARTIES

A. Number of Members of each Major Party

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP</u>	<u>POPULAR VOTE RECEIVED</u>	
		1945	1948
Social Democratic	70-90,000	425,948	494,719
Agrarian Party	100,000	362,662	465,638
Democratic Union composed of:		398,618*	375,820*
1) Communist Party	30-50,000		
2) Social Unity Party	1,000		
Coalition Party	62,000	255,394	320,366
Swedish Peoples Party	50,000	142,298	145,455
Progressive Party	13,000		
	TOTAL	<u>87,868</u> 1,698,376	<u>73,444</u> 1,879,968

* In the counting of the ballots, the Democratic Union votes are not broken down between the Communist Party and the Socialist Unity Party. However, there is a differentiation made in the assigning of Diet seats on the basis of the popular vote received, for which see section C below. For all intents and purposes, the Democratic Union is synonymous with the Communist Party.

B. Platforms of Major Parties -- Domestic and Foreign

1. Social Democratic Party: The Party's domestic platform consists broadly of combating the growth of Communism and preventing the Communist overthrow of Finland's democratic traditions, and more specifically, stabilization of Finnish economy, gradual social reform, and gradual nationalization of private enterprise

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in so far as it will benefit the national economy. On foreign policy, the party advocates preserving good relations with the USSR, even at the expense of broadening Finland's foreign relations with the West. The party supports Scandinavian unity and cooperation and is strongly in favor of increasing economic relations with the West where possible.

3. Agrarian Party: Domestically, this party is interested in the betterment of the living conditions of the rural population from an economic, social and cultural point of view. The rank-and-file of the party is strongly anti-Communist but some of the party leaders opportunistically favor cooperation with the Communists for political ends, i.e., the overthrow of the Social Democratic Government. Specific aims of the party are the gradual elimination of price control and the reintroduction of a free market system, the lowering of taxes on farm lands, the maintenance of high prices for farm products through government subsidies, and the raising of wages of farm laborers. On foreign policy the Agrarians favor closer relations with the USSR, believing that the Social Democratic Government is too pro-western. Their policy is based partly on fear of the USSR, which consideration does not enter into the planning of the Social Democrats, and the possibility that the Agrarians will require Communist support in a future attempt to overthrow the Social Democratic Government.

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3. Communist Party: The long-range Communist goal is the overthrow of the Finnish Government and the creation of a "Peoples Democracy". The more immediate domestic and foreign program of the party, as was recently set forth at a Party Congress, is to avert Finland's "impending economic crisis" by ending unemployment, remedying the difficulties of agriculture, supporting planned economy against capitalism, and maintaining and promoting Finnish-Soviet friendship. Characteristically, the Communists also stress at intervals such foreign policy aims as closer trade relations between Finland and the USSR and the Satellites and less dependence on trade with the West and Scandinavia. Such a policy if carried through would worsen Finland's economy.

4. Coalition Party: This party, having gained support in the 1948 elections, may come into greater prominence in the future. It represents traditionally conservative groups such as the clergy and the professions and is the most rightist Finnish political party. Its domestic program includes support for political freedom, a democratic constitution, free enterprise, and subsidies for the farmers. The party consistently supports the Social Democrats in the Diet. In the foreign policy field, the party is distinctly anti-USSR, as was clearly demonstrated a year ago when it came out strongly against the signing of the Finnish-USSR Mutual Assistance

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Fact. It advocates an equivocal policy of neutrality, without, however, any restrictions on the international activities of Finland.

5. Swedish Peoples Party: In domestic matters this party's policy is similar to that of the Coalition party with which it cooperates often. Since the party represents the Swedish minority in Finland, about 10% of the total population, it is vitally interested in the safeguarding of their rights and political interests. In general the Swedish Peoples Party can be depended upon to support the Social Democratic party in the Diet. The party advocates a foreign policy of Scandinavian cooperation, is strongly anti-USSR, and believes Finland's foreign policy to be too weak and too pro-Soviet.

6. Progressive Party: Although this party represents the educated middle classes, and many Government leaders are drawn from its ranks, its program consists of building itself up as link between labor and the bourgeoisie. The progressives can be expected to support the Social Democrats on vital issues in the legislature as it is a genuinely liberal party. The realistic foreign policy program supported by the progressives includes friendly relations with the USSR and the West, but avoidance of alliances which would jeopardize Finnish neutrality.

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C. Number of Members in Parliament Representing Each Party

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT</u>
Social Democratic	54
Agrarian	56*
Democratic Union	38
1) Communists	33
2) Social Unity	5
Coalition	38
Swedish Peoples	14
Progressive	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	200

*Due to the Finnish districting system, the Agrarian party received more Diet seats than the Social Democrats, although the Social Democrats received the largest popular vote.

D. Leading Personalities of the Social Democratic Party

Karl August Fagerholm	Leader of Social Democratic Party and Prime Minister
Aleksai Aaltonen	Minister of Social Affairs
Emlil Skog	Minister of Defense
Onni Hiltunen	Minister of Finance
Aarri Simonen	Minister of Interior
Uuno Takki	Minister of Trade
Tauno E. Suontausta	Minister of Justice
Onni E. Peltonen	Minister of Communications
Onni Tervonen	Minister of Supply

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Reino Oittinen	Minister of Education
Matti Lepistö	Minister of Agriculture
Emil Mannonen	Chairman, Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions
Valdemar Liljestrom	President, Metal Workers Union
V. Hakala	Chairman, Social Democratic Party Diet Group

B. Influence and Representation of Each Party in the Executive Branch of the Government

Only the Social Democratic Party is represented in the Executive branch of the Government. None of the other parties hold Ministerial portfolios. However, since the Agrarian Party has the largest Diet group and represents the interests of the farmers and rural areas of the country, as opposed to the Social Democrats who primarily represent the interests of labor, the Agrarians do exercise some indirect influence on Cabinet decisions. The Communists, though vociferous, exercise mainly a negative influence on the Cabinet, their demands usually serving as a warning to the Government of what not to do.

F. Relationship of the Social Democratic Party with other Finnish Parties in Aims and Activities

The relationship of the Social Democratic Party with the:

Agrarian Party

The Social Democrats have been unable to depend upon the Agrarians for support because of the relentless effort on the part of the Agrarians since early

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last fail to overthrow the Social Democratic Government. This has produced a dangerous situation for the Social Democrats who have found themselves faced several times with a hostile Agrarian-Communist coalition. The problem has not been resolved yet by the Social Democrats because the Agrarians are willing to offer the Communists cabinet positions for their support in overthrowing the Social Democratic Government. Thus, although the Social Democrats are willing to consider political demands of the Agrarians, the Agrarians will no longer consider participation in a coalition Government led by the Social Democrats.

Communist Party

The Social Democrats have been constantly on the alert to foil any attempts of the Communists to overthrow the Finnish Government. Furthermore, there is a constant struggle between the two parties for control of the Finnish labor movement. So far the Social Democrats have maintained a lead over the Communists, estimated at about 60-40, and have controlled the Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions. The Social Democratic party is the one party which has actively endeavored in the past few years to weaken Communism in Finland.

Coalition Party

The Social Democratic party has been able to count on Diet and public support from the Coalition party, which is important as members of the Coalition party

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control about 25% of the influential press in Finland.

Swedish Peoples Party

The Social Democrats can not consistently rely upon support from the Swedish Peoples Party because the Social Democratic legislative program often conflicts with the desires of the Swedish minority in Finland. However, the Social Democrats have so far received anti-Communist support from the Swedish Peoples party. There is believed to be a growing tendency within the party to support the Agrarian party if a new attempt is made to overthrow the Government. The Social Democrats could be voted out of office if such a swing took place on the part of the Swedish party.

Progressive Party

The Social Democratic Party can depend upon the Progressive party for political support in the Diet, because the Progressives as truly liberal party realize the dangers of presenting a new opportunity to the Communists to regain entry into the Cabinet through a government overthrow.

0. Social Democratic Party's Ties with and Support from other Scandinavian Social Democratic Parties

As a carry over from the pre-war days, the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties' leaders get together whenever an occasion presents itself, such as the

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recent celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. Since it so happens that all of the Scandinavian Prime Ministers are also the leaders of their respective Social Democratic Parties, official problems are likely to be discussed or statements of policy issued under the guise of a meeting of the representatives of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. It is believed also that the Social Democrats probably exchange views on such questions as labor education, party techniques, or the combatting of Communism. However, this does not imply that there are any coordinated programs of this nature, particularly as far as Finland is concerned. There is no evidence which indicates that financial assistance or other material help is exchanged between the parties.

Since the Finns are in no position to coordinate their activities openly with the Scandinavians, the only other value of the Social Democratic relationship to the Finns is that of moral support. There is no doubt that the parties feel mutually friendly, and there is strong sense of fellowship between them. The greatest value to the Finnish Social Democrats is that by sending representatives to a Scandinavian Social Democratic meeting, they are exhibiting a certain degree of independence of action which is good for Finnish morale.

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Project Proposal Memorandum

12 May 1949

To: B/EE (Att.: Intel. Control)
From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning
Subject: Special project

*Delivered
5/25 ~ 5/26
change 6/13*

Statement of Project

Origin: [REDACTED]

Problem: To summarize Communist infiltration and assumption of control in the Rumanian labour movement.

Assumptions:

Scope: As discussed [REDACTED] Study should be concise and summary in character

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Form: Working paper : not to be disseminated.

Dates: As soon as possible; to G/SA by 18 May if possible

Branch responsibilities: B/EE to prepare paper

Departmental responsibilities: None.

Please treat this project as a matter of highest confidence.

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C O P Y

Please arrange for one of your research people at the earliest moment to secure a copy of the book of Reuben Markham entitled Rumania under the Soviet Yoke. I request that this book be read and that those aspects of Communist take-over of the Rumanian labor movement be highlighted and annotated on the book proper.

It is also requested that if feasible a concise summary of Communist infiltration and assumption of control of the Rumanian labor movement be prepared. Please treat this as a matter of high priority.

Note by REL: Portion encircled in ink is the project requested in attached memo. —

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Control of the Rumanian Trade Union Movement

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(Insert: P. 4, beginning l. 17, through the word "unrest", line 22.)

Communism had never played a significant role in the Rumanian labor movement. As a party, it had been completely outlawed since 1924, although making a brief appearance in 1921 as the Social-Communist Party. By 1944, after Rumania's liberation by troops of the Soviet Union permitted the Party to emerge from the underground, it numbered only 1,000 members. Their hand was revealed occasionally in the more violent manifestations of labor unrest. In January 1932, the Party secretly held its Fifth Congress in order to strengthen itself organizationally and to clarify its position with regard to the peasants and minor nationalities. Much of the violence displayed at the Grivitza strike in 1933 must be ascribed to this re-activation of the Party during the preceding year. In 1936, an alleged offer on the part of the Communists to form an Anti-Fascist front was turned down by the Socialists. It was not until 1943 that the Communists finally succeeded in forming an anti-Hitlerite Patriotic Front as the basis for future cooperation between themselves and the Socialists.

p. 5, line 5: Insert "Constantin" before "Titel Petrescu"

Suggestion: p. 12, line 14 : leave out "rather child-like" (although true); perhaps substitute "somewhat immature"

p. 15, line 9: after the word "Communists", add: "and set up his own Independent Socialist Party."

p. 18, line 4: New paragraph beginning "Despite a powerful propaganda etc."

line 9: Omit sentence beginning "It was also reported in April 1949 etc."

p. 17, line 12: Omit the word "mid-" in "mid-December 1948"

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IP2

COMMUNIST CONTROL OF THE ROMANIAN TRADE UNION

MOVEMENT

1. Summary
2. Origins and Character of the Romanian Labor Movement
3. The Period of Communist-Socialist "Cooperation"
4. The Unions as a Communist Political Weapon
5. The Unions as a Communist Economic Weapon
6. The End of Communist-Socialist Cooperation
7. Present Status of the Romanian Labor Unions

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COMMUNIST CONTROL OF THE ROMANIAN TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

1. Summary

The aim of this paper is to outline the steps by which the Communists seizure of the trade-union movement in Rumania was accomplished, to describe the part played by the unions in bringing the Communists to power, and the role to which they have now been reduced.

An analysis of the tactics used to subjugate the Rumanian labor movement to Communist objectives provides a classic example of how a handful of Kremlin-sponsored Communists were able to exploit the legitimate aspirations of the working class in order to pressure their way to power. Although 80% of the population of Rumania were engaged in agriculture, the approximately 400,000 industrial and craft workers were concentrated in and around Bucharest, the capital, as well as the key cities of Transylvania, the Banat and the port areas. This relatively cohesive mass, organized and controlled by leftists, thus constituted an intrinsic political force far out of proportion to the number of workers actually involved.

Although the Communists had never played a significant role in the development of the Rumanian trade union movement, the Antonescu fiat driving the unions underground in 1940 only permitted the Communists to infiltrate their limited cadres into the most influential union positions. In the upsurge of popular enthusiasm which followed the August 1944 liberation, the Communists obtained an equal share with the Social Democrats in organizing and directing the unions, and through coercion, fraud and terrorism, progressively eliminated all elements which dared to combat their usurpation of power. Flying brigades of armed workers and ex-German collaborationists formed the militant arm of the Communist Party, making a constant show of force and ultimately threatening the country with civil war if their demands were not met. Rumania, unarmed,

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occupied by Soviet troops, and at the mercy of Communist-appointed police, was in no position to resist. The inevitable climax was reached on 6 March 1945, when under Soviet pressure the left-wing Gorza government openly assumed control and undertook to mop up centers of resistance remaining in the country. The labor unions, which had proved to be an effective political weapon in the hands of the Communists, later served as an economic weapon directed first against capital, then against the workers themselves. With the consolidation of Communist control of the Government, which continued apace from 1945 through 1948 and is today essentially complete, the trade unions have been transformed into a government monopoly on the Soviet model, functioning as transmission belts of Party policy to the masses.

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2. Origins and Character of the Rumanian Labor Movement

Organization of the Rumanian Workers began early in the 20th century, when considerable foreign capital was brought in to develop a backward, albeit potentially rich area where labor was plentiful and cheap. Prior to World War I, these early unions were confined to the railroads, petroleum industry, textile mills, woodworking and printing plants, and a few other enterprises of an industrial nature. Workers in Transylvania and the Banat, then part of the more advanced Austro-Hungarian Empire, were better organized than their compatriots in the Old Kingdom. After the first World War, the union movement rapidly gained momentum. The right to organize openly was obtained in 1921. Two years later, the Constitution of 1923 guaranteed the right of association, with specific mention of the general rights of labor.

The not inconsiderable gains made by the Rumanian workers up to the ban imposed on unions in 1940 were acquired through a number of spectacular strikes and riots. One of the earliest of these occurred in December 1918, when troops were used against the workers for the first time. During the twenties, the economic and political life of the country was tightly controlled by the ultra-conservative National Liberal Party, which represented the most powerful economic group in Rumania. Even the victory of the National Peasant Party at the polls in 1929 did not relax the rigorous paternalism exercised towards the workers by the ruling class. That same year, a famous coal mine strike was broken by Prime Minister Iuliu Maniu, leader of the National Peasants, at a cost of 24 dead strikers. By 1930 economic unrest had reached a point where it was threatening the stability of the country. This contributed to the recall of Carol to the throne, but in 1933 a memorable railway strike at the Grivita Repair Shops had far-reaching repercussions in that most of the Communists in power today were imprisoned as a result of the strike. In 1938, King Carol

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dissolved the unions, replacing them with State corporate organizations patterned after the Guilds of fascist Italy. These in turn became a dead letter on 18 December 1940, when the Antonescu regime abrogated the laws relating to their activity and prohibited the organization of unions.

Although driven underground, it appears that the unions continued to exist and even maintained relations with the management of their respective enterprises. Collective contracts remained in force; plant managers continued to treat surreptitiously with the old union leaders. As national sentiment rose against the regime and its German allies, a certain feeling of solidarity between the owners and workers tended to develop. However, since the unions were still outlawed, elections could be held only infrequently and then in clandestine fashion. Leaders occasionally assumed direction of the union's activities without the formality of a vote, by a display of superior energy in attacking the Antonescu regime and sabotaging the German overlords. Many of these new leaders were Communists, who laid claim to being the most active defenders of Rumanian liberties.

Communism had never played a significant role in the Rumanian labor movement, and as a party it had been outlawed, particularly since the Russian revolution, and until Rumania was liberated by troops of the S.U. By 1944, when it emerged from the underground, the Communist Party numbered only 1,000 members. Their hand was revealed occasionally in the more violent manifestations of labor unrest. The Social Democrats, on the contrary, had always been the driving force in the Rumanian labor movement. They found supporters among many of the Rumanian intellectuals. Contact was maintained by the Social Democrats with the Socialist Internationale, while none was kept up with the III Internationale or Comintern. Some unions were organized along purely national lines and were associated with the National Peasant Party; these were called "yellow unions" in contrast to the "red" ones.

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3. The Period of Communist-Socialist "Cooperation"

When it became apparent, early in 1944, that Rumania might soon be in a position to withdraw from the war, on Germany's side, all opposition elements tended to eschew their differences and to merge their forces for the day when Rumania would be free. In May 1944, Lucretiu Patrascanu, leader of the Communists still at large in Rumania, and Titel Petrescu, representing the Socialists, secretly organized what later was to become the United Workers Front. An interim commission was set up on the basis of parity between the two parties, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the workers were Socialists. Communist insistence on the principle of parity in the organization of executive committees for the labor unions as a whole later proved to be the undoing of the Socialists. Meanwhile, during the summer of 1944, the Communists energetically went ahead with the organization of armed worker squads in Bucharest, formed to protect the factories during the liberation of the capital, but later used as Communist "goon" squads. These armed units provided the striking power of the Communists and formed the nucleus of what amounted to a Communist militia.

Following the coup d'etat of 23 August 1944 by the coalition National Democratic Bloc consisting of the National Liberal, National Peasant, Socialist and Communist Parties, a Royal Decree again granted the unions complete freedom to organize. Thereupon the underground commission of Socialists and Communists announced that it constituted a provisional labor committee to direct the United Workers Front until the formal Congress of the General Confederation of Labor could be called in January 1945. This provisional committee consisted of ten members, five Socialists and five Communists. National Peasant Party labor leaders, were, therefore, excluded from participation in this policy-forming committee. The Communists in the provisional committee, most of whom had just been released from prison, were aggressive leaders of a new type, full of

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organizational seal, and able to negotiate directly with the Soviet occupation forces. The executive committees set up in the local unions were formed again with the fatal 50% Communist representation. Nominally, the national provisional committee was presided over by the pre-war trade union president, Brat-faleanu. At the Congress of the Rumanian General Confederation of Labor, which was held in Bucharest 26-30 January 1945, a new executive committee was formed, this time dominated by the Communists, whose candidate Gheorghe Apostol was elected president. Since the Communists had achieved control of the Congress by a bare majority, however, they made no overt move to rupture the agreed-upon unity between the leftist parties. This policy continued in diminishing degree throughout the year of 1945.

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4. The Unions as a Communist Political Weapon

The Communist President of the General Confederation of Labor, Gheorghe Apostol, wrote following the January 1945 Congress that "the united working class is a powerful force and the united syndicates, comprising a million and a half in the ranks of the GCL, awaken and mobilize the working masses, leading them to political combat, in which they participate in direct fashion." This participation consisted primarily in mass demonstrations in the streets of the capital and leading provincial cities. Such demonstrations served as a constant show of force by the left-wing parties, which claimed wide popular support. In the event of shooting and disorders brought on by the demonstrators themselves, they could be cited as evidence that the government was unable to maintain order. The first significant test of strength occurred in October 1944, when mass demonstrations by the trade unions were held in Bucharest to protest the Sanatescu government. This broke the agreement between the so-called Historical Parties, or National Liberal and National Peasant Parties, and the two left parties, Socialists and Communists, which had resulted in the National Democratic Bloc and was followed by the formation of the Communist-dominated National Democratic Front (FND). The new coalition was confined to the Socialists and Communists, together with the General Confederation of Labor, Peasants' Front and Socialist Peasant Party. A prolonged government crisis in November 1944 was fomented by frequent mass demonstrations organized by the Confederation of Labor and carefully orchestrated by the Communists. A temporary truce between the Right and the Left permitted the formation on 2 December of a coalition government headed by General Radescu, a conservative patriot who was initially acceptable to the leftists, many of whom had been in prison with him under Antonescu. The Radescu government approved in January 1945 a trade union law which acknowledged the functioning

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of "factory committees" and the complete right of all workers and state employees to organize into unions.

Following the return of Gheorghiu-Dej and Ana Pauker from Moscow in January 1945, the latent hostility between the right and the left factions became steadily more open and unrestrained. The demand of the National Democratic Front for exclusive control of the government was launched to coincide with the Congress of the General Confederation of Labor. The sessions of the latter served as another platform for Communist spokesmen. Gheorghiu-Dej, Communist Minister of Communications in the Radescu government, demanded that "the reactionaries should be ousted from the government". The Congress was followed by Communist-inspired massive demonstrations in the capital and throughout the provinces. These were viewed by the Soviets as an impressive expression of the people's will. The printers' union, one of the few completely dominated by the Communists, served as an effective instrument for muzzling opposition newspapers. The union flatly refused to print articles or editorials hostile to the left and exercised a capricious censorship at its own discretion quite apart from government or Soviet censors. The Premier, therefore, was forced to take to the radio to bring his case against the leftists before the Rumanian people. In his speech he attacked the use of the unions as political rather than professional organizations and indicated that he shared the belief of the National Peasant Party that the Confederation of Labor should be deprived of its status as a political party. His indictment of the Communist-dominated Confederation of Labor was followed on 13 February 1945 by another street demonstration in Bucharest. On 17 February, adherents of the FND -- in large part members of the Confederation of Labor -- attacked the headquarters of the Prefects in Craiova and Caracal. It should be remembered that such acts not only were protected but openly encouraged by the Communists in the government.

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to the Prefects that all instructions from the Premier were to be ignored, allowing the Police to operate openly as agents of the Communists. The Communists staged a vast show of force in Bucharest on 24 February with a procession of 75,000-100,000 participants bearing placards, flags and pictures. Attendance was mandatory for union members. Groups of workers placed at strategic intervals along the streets were organized into cliques which chanted the customary virulent FND slogans under Communist direction. Several hundred marchers, said to have been factory workers led by Ana Pauker, moved against the Ministry of the Interior, where Radescu was known to be. Gunfire between the soldiery and the marchers resulted. This demonstration revealed to the Government how easily such disorders could be transformed into civil war by fanatical Communists. It likewise provided the Soviets with the excuse they had been seeking to install the Grossu Government on the grounds that Radescu was acting contrary to the wishes of the people and was, therefore, unable to maintain order.

Following the triumph of the Communist-dominated National Democratic Front on 6 March 1945, Romanian workers were regimented in the all-powerful General Confederation of Labor, (GCL) to which all labor unions were made responsible. In theory, the trade union locals were directed by the Central Committee of the given syndicate or Trade Union. In reality, the locals were merged into a combined labor organization for the area. The committees of these combined unions were appointed by the Central Committee of the GCL, which was in turn dominated by Communists who issued the directives. Within each local trade union council there were also women's and youth sections, which were subordinated to the Communist-dominated National Women's and Youth Organizations. The whole complicated organization was subservient to the National Confederation of Labor. All lines of command led up to the small clique of Communists in

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control of the Central Committee of the GCL.

Although the Communists had succeeded in achieving only a bare majority control of the GCL Congress in January 1945, they were able to consolidate their position over the ensuing months. The seizure of control in the most important labor unions and the Confederation of Labor itself was carried out, moreover, against the will of the majority of the rank and file, most of whom belonged to other parties. T

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The use of terrorist methods by the Communists was generally avoided in the first two series of union elections, held throughout the country in October 1944 and January 1945. In those days, it was even possible for some National Peasant workers to be elected to large industrial plant committees, even though the Communists constantly played on Socialist sympathies to maintain labor leadership as a monopoly of the left. By the end of 1944, however, most Rumanians were thoroughly satiated with the Russians and their Communist henchmen. A steady recrudescence of Rumanian nationalism took the form of outspoken resistance to Communist bullying. The growth of Rumanian nationalism, in turn, forced the Communists to adopt more violent methods. At the important Balazs Works in Bucharest, for example, 3, 600 employees of the plant in February 1945 submitted a petition demanding the resignation of the old Committee and a new election. Before the voting was interrupted by the invasion of armed left-wing elements not employed in the plant, only 700 votes had been cast for the Communists of the 4,500 participating in the meeting. Gheorghe Apostol, Communist President of the GCL, was wounded by a bullet, but nine opponents of the FND were killed. No real intervention was made either by the police or Soviet officers who were present. Several anti-Communists were arrested following the fracas.

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In general, elections which went against the Communists and their Socialist allies were annulled by the GDL Central Committee, former leftist leaders reinstated, or a series of elections held until the Communists were satisfied with the results. Meanwhile, the Communists were building up their "flying brigades" of armed workers or recruits from among former Iron Guards and Bundists who were already seriously compromised by their collaboration with the Germans. These were organized into teams, equipped with arms and government trucks, and sent out to critical sectors to intimidate elements the Communists wished to cow or eliminate. These teams, many of them made up of Railroad workers, were paid top wages although no work was required of them. The passive majority of workers were forced to attend meetings, parades and demonstrations, or incur the risk of losing their seniority, production bonuses, or commissary supplies, or being suspended or dismissed, and even beaten or imprisoned. Fraud was frequently practised in order to draw people out to demonstrate whenever the Communists required a show of popular support, or to sign petitions called for by the Communists. Any opposition to Communist domination of the labor movement was thus progressively neutralized, dominated and finally eliminated in the relentless sweep to power of the Communist machine, which culminated in the fraudulent national elections of November 1946. To assure the victory of the FPD and the "Elec of Democratic Parties" in this first post-war election, the Communists placed great reliance on the strong-arm labor organization it had built up to terrorize the opposition, flood the country with propaganda, and eventually, to stuff the ballot boxes with votes marked by the union-committees.

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V. The Unions as Communist Economic weapon

The Rumanian trade unions functioned no less efficiently as an economic arm in the hands of the Communists and their so-called National Democratic Front Government. It was made plain that membership in the unions, besides being increasingly compulsory, offered a number of important advantages to those willing to cooperate. These may be summarized as:

- a) Collective contracts between the unions and enterprises, establishing minimum wages, regular pay increases, free medical aid, social security, an 8-hr day, guaranteed holidays and other worker rights which had long been recognized as desirable by the people as a whole;
- b) Free meals and rations, supplied to union members in factory "canteens" at low official prices. Such aid, at a time of inflation, crop failures and shortages, exerted a decisive pressure on the workers.
- c) Weekly meetings between representatives of the workers and management, which not only tended to flatter the rather child-like Rumanian worker but gave him an opportunity to demand constant wage adjustments, so long as the Communists found these expedient, in order to meet the rising cost of living;
- d) A policy of favoring union workers at the expense of all other social classes.

Conversely, the growing arrogance of the unions and their leaders was a constant thorn in the side of the enterprise owners (prior to the nationalization of industries in 1948. Although the master collective labor contract, which was drawn up between the GCL and the General Association of Rumanian Industrialists (UGIR) and approved in January 1946 by the Labor Ministry, stipulated that union committees had no right to interfere in management, the opposite was more often the case. ²¹

The weekly labor-management meetings frequently degenerated into wrangles as to responsibility for management's failure to supply certain scarce items in the

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economists, for production failures, declines in labor output or machinery stoppages.^{23/} The erstwhile docile Rumanian worker felt that under his government's patronage he was not in a position to assert himself. Numerous foremen and administrative personnel were discharged at the request of the union.^{24/} The enterprise committees could hire, fire or give leave to any employee, whereas the enterprise owner was unable to take a step without consulting the union committee and obtaining its approval. In many cases, the enterprise was forced to make excessive financial expenditures in order to carry out union plans. The unions were ordered to check production figures and exercise surveillance over all materials entering or leaving the plant. Since the owners were forced to supply a quota of their production to the state at fixed prices, although able to purchase their raw materials only on the black market, their one opportunity to recoup losses was to sell the remainder of their output at the highest "unofficial" prices then current. The surveillance maintained by the workers, ultimately to their own detriment, rendered it increasingly dangerous for the industrialists to dispose of their goods at prevailing prices rather than the ridiculously low prices set by the government. In the end, this constant drain on the reserves of the smaller capitalists ruined more than one enterprise owner, who was prevented from closing his factory or even shutting it down for repairs, on penalty of being charged with sabotage.^{25/} Certain state-operated institutions such as the railroads set up wage scales which were nearly double those paid by the private firms. These were used as a political yardstick to deplete further the diminishing reserves of the capitalists. Throughout the long period of economic chaos which followed the advent of the Grosse Government, little apparent effort was made by the Communists to stabilize the situation. It soon became evident, to the employees as well as the employers, that the Communists were pursuing purely political aims rather than the economic betterment of the country or the welfare of labor.

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VI. The End of Communist-Socialist Cooperation.

Although it has been estimated that in 1945 the Socialists among the Rumanian workers numbered between 35 and 45%, whereas the Communists could count on not more than 5% and possibly only 2% of the total workers, ²⁶/ Socialist acceptance of the principle of parity in the Provisional Labor Commission, the Executive Committee of the GCL and the committees of the unions provided the Communists with useful lever. The Communists were satisfied to maintain this apparent equilibrium, operating so satisfactorily to further Communist rather than Socialist interests, at least until their effective control of the Government was assured. Consequently, the fiction of the United Workers Front was maintained up until the fusion of the dissident Socialists and Communists in the United Workers Party in February 1948, although the bulk of the Socialists had long since been ousted from the organization. Initially, the Communists were able to enlist the support of the Socialists against representatives of the rightist National Peasant Party, which had its own labor unions, youth and women's organizations. The National Peasant Party, in order to capitalize on the growing discontent with Communist policies, appointed Dr. Ilie Lazar to head its organizing activities among labor. Since both the Socialists and the Communists regarded the workers as their exclusive property, they combined forces to exclude agents of the National Peasant Party from the factories and unions. Dr. Lazar was imprisoned for a period, while others of his assistants were badly beaten. ²⁷/ In Transylvania, where the National Peasants were strongest, the Communists resorted to strong-arm methods and forced them to withdraw from active work in the factories.

The Socialists, on the other hand, were allowed to organize freely throughout 1945. The workers, whenever forced to choose between the two Marxist parties, leaned heavily towards the Socialists. As a result of the growing Socialist strength among the workers, who had become dissatisfied with the arbitrary acts of the

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Communists entrenched in the factory committees by virtue of the United Workers Front agreement, the Socialists began to demand more than 50% of the seats in the local union executive committees. This demand the Communists would not grant. It was reported that the Central Committee of the Communist Party then issued the order that the Socialists were to be broken. ²⁸/ The Communist opportunity presented itself in March 1946, when the question arose of drawing up a common ticket of candidates for the November National Election. Titel Petrescu, President of the Social Democrat Party, refused to submerge the growing strength of his party in a bloc that would be dominated by the Communists. A minority group led by Lotar Radacescu ostentatiously broke with the Petrescu Socialists and joined the Communist Bloc. The followers of Petrescu, who represented a majority of Socialists were thereupon outlawed from any participation in meetings of the United Workers Front, thus giving complete control of the unions to the Communists. Actually, the government parties could not command the support of more than 20% of the workers. The non-Communist opposition, divided more or less equally between Socialists and National Peasants, represented a helpless 80%. On the eve of the ^{national} November 1946/elections, a combined meeting of the Central Committees of the Dissident Socialists and Communists was addressed by Gheorghiu-Dej and the Communist front Miss Levin. Both stressed permanent collaboration between Communists and "Socialists", elimination of "diversionist elements" which had crept into both organizations, and political annihilation of the Petrescu Socialists. ²⁹/ With regard to the General Confederation of Labor, both speakers gave assurances that the unity of the trade unions would be maintained, anarchical (i.e., independent) unionist activities would be suppressed, and the Executive Committee of the OGL, 75% of which were Communists, would set the general political line of the trade unions. ²⁹/

In November 1947, the second Congress of the General Confederation of Labor was held in Bucharest. This body went through the formality of electing a new Central Committee of 93 persons, ³¹/ which included such militant Communists as

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Gheorghe Apostol, who retained his post as OCL president, Alexandru Jianovici, Gheorghe Stoica, Miss Levin, and Iosba Chisinevachi. ¹² The Socialists who were permitted to play any role at all, either in the Government or the Confederation of Labor, were Socialists in name only, and executed to the letter Communist policy. Finally, formation of the United Workers Front in February 1948 signified that the Socialist label had become something less than symbolic. The United Workers Party had become, in effect, only a euphemism for the Communist Party, which it copied in its statutes, organization and policies. The function of this single Workers Party, as stated by Gheorghiu-Dej before the Party Organising Committee, is to provide "the working classes with a unified general staff, capable of assuring determination in their future political orientation, of assuring united class will and action, of making possible those achievements which will lead to Socialism...through a Popular Democracy." ¹³

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VII. Present Status of the Rumanian Labor Unions

The GUL newspaper, Viata Sindicala of 31 January 1948 reported that the General Confederation of Labor then consisted of 23 trade-union federations with 77 trade unions, 105 regional coordination committees and over 5,000 factory or enterprise committees. A total membership of 1,337,586 was claimed. The unions most vociferous in propagating the Communist line were the Federations of Railway Workers, Metallurgical and Chemical Workers, Artists, Writers and Journalists, Typographical Workers, Artisans and Craftsmen, Agricultural Workers, and the white collar unions. However, in March 1949 the Journalists and Writers were merged with the Printers Union, on the grounds that union groups must be formed on the site of production. ⁵/ This has afforded the Communists even closer supervision of "bourgeois" activities.

In mid-December 1948, the Central Committee of the Workers Party formalized its dominance over the trade unions in the Rumanian People's Democracy. ⁵/ The unions have now been transformed into a state monopoly with few rights for the workers and many obligations. Since the adoption of the One-Year Economic Plan in January 1949, the watchword has been overfulfillment of norms or quotas, which are increased as rapidly as they are reached, the organization of "socialist competition" among the workers, and strict observance of labor discipline and collective contracts. ⁵/ The Rumanian trade unions now comply with all the devices hallowed in the Soviet Union. In February 1949, a Trade Union delegation headed by Luaba Chisinevachi visited the Soviet Union to study socialist techniques, and appropriately, Rumania was represented at the 10th Trade Union Congress of the USSR by GUL president Georgehe Apostol and Stelian Mogaru, president of the Railway Union.

At a meeting of the General Confederation of Labor on 7-11 January 1949, a new collective labor contract was adopted with wage scales for the workers graduated

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according to category. Stress was laid on minimum production norms, penalties for absences, increased production and labor efficiency. Likewise, the authority of the labor federations was strengthened, providing tighter control and direction of the locals.³⁹ Despite a powerful propaganda campaign³⁹ to convince the workers that the new wage scale will assure increased output with a consequent rise in the standard of living, the workers are reported to be displaying considerable discontent.³⁹ Much of the dissatisfaction is said to be found among the railroad workers, who originally supplied the most ardent supporters of the Communist Party. It was also reported in April 1949 that the former Malaxa Metal Works in Bucharest continues to harbor dissident elements, with the result that the workers are subjected to search on entering or leaving the heavily guarded plant.⁴⁰ Since the promised reforms in living conditions have not materialized, the workers are resentful of the increased pressures for greater production and stricter discipline, in addition to the supplementary time demanded by the Communist Party for meetings, ideological indoctrination and "volunteer labor". All hiring by state and private enterprises is now subject to Ministry of Labor control. Individuals refusing to conform to conditions of employment are punishable under the law as saboteurs.⁴¹

In spite of the disaffection of the workers, no recourse is possible except that of submission to the Communists. The Romanian State, under Communist control, is prepared to use its police powers and forced-labor camps to stamp out any resistance. The Communist newspaper Scanteia editorialized at the end of 1948 that "the workers must be educated in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, and the trade unions must become a 'veritable school of Communism'".⁴² Now an effective arm of the Communist Party, the unions will be used (1) to provide candidates amenable to the Communists for the various electoral posts,⁴³ (2) as a lever to increase production, and (3) as an important channel for imposing and controlling public opinion, particularly with regard to ~~the~~ East-West issues.⁴⁴

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The traditional role of the trade-union movement, that of protecting the worker against exploitation by his employer, has been subordinated to the objectives of the Communist Party and the goals of a sovietized state.

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Project Proposal Memorandum

Request of
12 May 1949

To: B/FE
From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning
Subject: Special study

*Delivered 6/10
(very extensive
paper)*

Statement of Project

Origin: G/SI

Problem: To estimate Communist influence among overseas Chinese

Assumptions:

To be developed as suggested on attached sheet.

Scope:

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Form: Working paper: no dissemination.

Dates: To G/SI by 10 June 1949

Branch responsibilities: To be prepared by B/FE

Departmental responsibilities: None

CONFIDENTIAL

11 May 1949

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Staff Intelligence Group, ORE

25X1A

FROM :

SUBJECT : Study of Communist Influence Amongst
Overseas Chinese

1. It is requested that a research project be initiated to determine the political coloration of Chinese Nationals resident in Asiatic and Middle Eastern states other than China proper. The study should also seek to determine the basis for that coloration, the extent to which Communism is prevalent in such groups, the extent of any trend toward Communism, if such exists, and the reasons for such trend, if such can be determined.

2. Care should be taken to distinguish between sympathy for and support of the Chinese Communists as Chinese and the Soviet brand of Communism.

3. The presence of or contacts with Soviet agents working from or responsible to the USSR should be determined if possible.

4. The effort should also be made to determine the extent to which Communists or Communist supporters among such groups are negotiating with, aiding or supporting native popular independence movements and native unrest.

desired by mid-June

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

10 June 1949

Via:

Chief, DFC
Chief, G/SI
Chief, B/FE

"The Political Coloration of Chinese Nationals Resident in Asiatic and Middle Eastern States other than China Proper"

1. Pursuant to your request for a special study on "The Political Coloration of Chinese Nationals Resident in Asiatic and Middle Eastern States other than China Proper", the enclosed study in two copies is submitted. This study is based on considerable research in depth, as well as fifteen (15) responses from various areas in the field to specific collection requests concerning the subject. In order that this study may be of maximum benefit as a working intelligence estimate, an exhaustive country-by-country treatment is presented. The entire study is synthesized and pointed up in the Summary and Conclusions.

2. This project will be a continuing one and will be expanded in the near future to encompass factors other than just Chinese minority groups. As more information becomes available, it will be forwarded.

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WJM
6 June 1949

Project Proposal Memorandum

To: B/EE (Int control)

CANCELLED

From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning

Subject: Special project

Statement of Project

Origin:

Problem: Special estimate on Scandinavia and Finland

Assumptions: War by 2 June 1950

USSR has occupied Western Europe (excluding ~~WESTERN~~
UK) and Scandinavia

(Request of 6 June)

Scope:

Classification to be no higher than: TS

Form: Internal project

Dates: to G/SI for transmittal as soon as possible

Branch responsibilities: B/EE to prepare paper in consultation with
B/No.

Departmental responsibilities: None

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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100020001-4

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TP5

Estimate of the Military Situation on the Greek-Albanian Frontier

Aid to the Greek guerrillas from Albania has continued to be considerable in recent months. Albania has not only been a refuge and base of operations but has forwarded considerable military equipment to the guerrillas including artillery. A recent increase in guerrilla artillery strength in the Vitsi are undoubtedly originated in Albania. Many reports have been received of truck movements within Albania alongside the Greek border. Albania has also been used as a convenient route for the redeployment of guerrilla troops in Greece alongside the border. Albania is estimated to be a supply base for over three quarters or nearly 15,000, of the guerrillas now operating in Greece. Approximately 10,000 of the guerrillas in Greece are in the Gramos-Vitsi stronghold on the / Albanian frontier. Greek general staff estimates place the number of guerrilla reserves in Albania as 8,000.

The present number of Soviet personnel in Albania is estimated as high as 3,000 with increases noticed recently. Soviet and satellite shipping to Albania has likewise shown an increase in recent months, and it is estimated that war material destined for the Greek guerrillas is involved in many of these shipments.

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IP-5

Request 10 June

B/EE

"Est. of the Mil. Situation
on the Greek-Albanian
Frontier"

Delivered 10 June, 1949

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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100020001-4

IP-6

Request 27 June '49
"Spanish Subversive Coalition"


B/W E

27 June 1p. and attachments

sent direct.

No file copy from Branch.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100020001-4

27 June 1949

Project Process Memorandum

B/EE (Intelligence Control)

From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning

Subject: Communist Party Congress

Statement of Project

Origin: G/SI

Problem: To provide the information requested on the attached sheet.

Considerations:

Scope:

Classification to be no higher than: **Top Secret**

Form: Working paper; not for dissemination

Dates: To G/SI as early as possible

Branch responsibilities: B/EE to prepare paper

Departmental responsibilities: **None**

Date 18 July 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, STAFF INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SUBJECT: Transmission of Draft Report.

ENCLOSURE: IP-7, "The 18th Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union"

1. Enclosure is hereby forwarded for review ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XX~~

2. This draft report has been coordinated informally with
the organizations checked below:

None

Within ORE

Branches

Western Europe
Eastern Europe/USSR
Near East/Africa
Far East/Pacific
Northern
Latin America

Groups

Global Survey
Economics Group
International Orgs.
Transportation

Outside ORE

State (OIR)
Army (ID/CSUSA)
Navy (ONI)
Air (D/IAF)

3. Maps to be included in this report and arrangements for
their production by the Map Branch are as follows:

None

4. Comments:

None

Chief, B/EE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	INITIALS	DATE
1	AD/R&E	
2	G/SI	
3		
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
FROM	INITIALS	DATE
1	G/SI	19 July
2		
3		

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☒ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☒ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS: Propose forwarding this to OPC.


 JUL 19 1949
 AD-17

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18 July 1949

SUBJECT: IP-7, "Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)."

1. Reference is made to Project Proposal Memorandum originated by G/SI on 27 June 1949, subject as above.

2. A comprehensive search of files in B/EE, OGD/BIR, and State/BI reveals that information on the subject is extremely limited. Available information is presented in the following paragraphs.

a. The last Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) was the 18th in 1939. In February 1941 there was an All-Union Party Conference, also the 18th. Since it is only after a Congress or a Conference that a complete list of the Central Committee is usually published, the 1941 list is at present the latest available.

b. In the 18th Congress in 1939 there were elected 71 full members and 68 candidate members. The membership in the 18th Conference in 1941 was 84 full members and 65 candidate members. A further tabulation of changes between 1939 and 1941 follows:

(1) Full Members

71	Total 1939
8	Demoted to candidate members 1941
9	Dropped on 1941 list
<u>54</u>	1939 members also members 1941
14	1939 candidates raised to full membership
<u>16</u>	New members
84	Total full members 1941

(2) Candidate Members

68	Total 1939
18	Dropped on 1941 list
14	Raised to full membership 1941
<u>36</u>	1939 candidates also candidates 1941
8	Full members 1939 demoted to candidates 1941
<u>21</u>	New candidates
65	Total candidate membership 1941

(3) The 9 missing full members between 1939 and 1941

2	Apparently died a natural death
	Killed in action
	Purged and executed
	Purged and imprisoned or sent to labor camps
	Disappeared with no mention
7	No information

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-2-

(4) The 18 missing alternate members 1939-1941

- Apparently died a natural death
- Killed in action
- Purged and executed
- Purged and imprisoned or sent to labor camps
- 15* Purged - no mention of punishment
- Disappeared with no mention
- 3 No information

c. Information on changes in membership since the 1941 Conference is practically negligible. Zhulanov, a full member, died in 1948, apparently of natural causes. Shaposhnikov, an alternate member in 1939, but not included in the 1941 list, died of illness in 1943. It is probable that an unknown number of members were killed during the war, but no detailed data is available.

*For a listing of the purged members see Tab "A"

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TAB "A"

Data on 18th All-Union Party Conference

1. According to Pravda of 21 February 1961, at the XVIIIth All-Union Party Conference the following were excluded from Alternate Membership in the Central Committee for non-fulfillment of their duties:

Antonov, D. I.
Biryukov, N. I.
Wainberg, G. D.
Basmachushina, P. S.
Zuravlev, V. P.
Ignatov, N. G.
Kovalev, M. P.
Iskanderov, A. B.

Nevezhin, N. I.
Rastegin, G. S.
Samokhvalov, A. I.
Feldenko, N. V.
Frolkov, A. A.
Shagimardanov, F. V.
Yatsov, V. V.

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IP-8

6 July 1949

Chief, OPC
Attention: [REDACTED]
Assistant Director, ORE

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Reported Spanish Subversive Coalition

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1. In compliance with [REDACTED] request
of 24 June 1949 to [REDACTED] of my office, I take
pleasure in forwarding ORE's estimate on the Reported
Spanish Subversive Coalition.

THEODORE BABBITT

Attachment:

JUL 6 1949
AP-21